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ABSTRACT This essay furthers debate about the burgeoning science of Probabilistic Event Attribution (PEA) 
and its relevance to imminent climate policy decisions.  It critically examines Allen Thompson and Friederike Otto’s 
recent arguments concerning the implications of PEA studies for how the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) policy framework should be revised during the 2016 ‘review and decision.’  I show that 
their contention that PEA studies cannot usefully inform decision-making about adaptation policies and strategies is 
misguided and argue that the current UNFCCC treaty, the “Paris Agreement,” supersedes their proposed revision. 
 
There has been a lot of recent debate about whether and how Probabilistic Event Attribution 
studies (PEAs) can inform climate policy decision-making (see James et al. 2014; Hulme et al. 2011; 
Hulme 2014; Pall et al. 2011; Stott et al. 2013; Thompson & Otto 2015).  PEAs use super-ensemble 
climate models and statistical analyses to attribute the occurrence of specific extreme weather events 
and their impacts (e.g. a drought) to human drivers of climate change (Allen 2003; Stott et al. 2004; 
Pall et al. 2011; Otto et al. 2012; Bindoff et al. 2013; Stone et al. 2013).  PEA researchers make such 
“attributions” by establishing that a selected climate change driver played a significant role in 
bringing about a specific extreme weather event.  They do this by comparing super-ensemble data 
models in which the event occurs with possible scenario simulations where selected climate drivers 
are removed and that weather event does not occur.  Through such comparative analyses, they show 
that an event’s likelihood of occurrence would have been substantially lower had the relevant driver 
not been present (e.g. had U.S. emissions been much lower). 
This paper pushes forward discussion of the methods used in PEAs and the relevance of 
PEAs to imminent and immensely important decisions about the UNFCCC policy framework via 
critical response to philosopher Allen Thompson and climate scientist Friederike Otto’s arguments 
in a recent paper (2015).  One simple reason I critically respond to their paper to advance the 
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discussion about PEAs and pending UNFCCC decisions is that it is the most recent major 
installment in the published literature about PEAs and UNFCCC policy.  Their paper is also 
distinctive in presenting explicit arguments regarding the capabilities and limitations of PEAs for 
making different sorts of inferences relevant to climate policy and in presenting systematic 
justification for very specific recommendations for revising the UNFCCC framework.  Where 
numerous authors have drawn conclusions about the potential uses of PEAs and their implications 
for climate policy, Thompson & Otto (2015) give these issues a more prolonged and systematic 
philosophical treatment than one finds elsewhere in the literature. 
At the core of Thompson & Otto’s overall argument is the contention that PEA researchers 
can successfully attribute the occurrence of particular weather events to human drivers of climate 
change via the methods of PEA but cannot use those methods to make inferences about future 
events.  They say that because of this PEAs are “not directly relevant to adaptation planning” 
(following Hulme et al. 2011; Hulme 2014) but can directly inform decision-making about losses and 
damages due to climate change (contra Hulme) (p. 3).  Accordingly, their preliminary positive 
argument is straightforward: because the methods of PEA enable researchers to link extreme events 
(e.g. “heat waves and subsequent droughts”) to losses and damages (e.g. “loss of human life [and] 
damage to economic productivity”), PEAs provide information that is useful for policy and strategy 
decision-making concerning losses and damages due to climate change (p. 2; cf. Bhattacharya 2003; 
Field et al. 2012; Spross 2014). 
Thompson & Otto further argue that, since PEAs cannot inform decisions about adaptation 
and mitigation but can directly inform decisions about losses and damages, there are “conceptual 
reasons” to reverse the decision made at COP19 (Warsaw 2013) to provisionally locate policy 
mechanisms concerning losses and damages (the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage 
[WIM]) within the framework’s “adaptation pillar” (the Cancun Adaptation Framework [CAF]) during 
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the 2016 ‘review and decision.’  They propose accomplishing this by adding a major framework 
“pillar” that is “on par with [existing] mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, and financing” 
pillars, containing liability-based mechanisms designed to address international justice issues 
pertaining to losses and damages due to climate change (p. 3).  In essence, they submit that while it 
is at best unclear whether losses and damages can be adequately addressed via adaptive and 
mitigatory measures, PEAs provide grounds for policy mechanisms that would require parties 
shown liable (via PEAs) to make reparations to parties whose peoples experience losses or damages. 
Herein, I show that Thompson & Otto’s conclusions about the limitations of PEAs and 
about how that the UNFCCC framework should be revised to better address losses and damages 
that will result from extreme events due to climate change are problematic.  I defuse their claim that 
PEAs “are not directly relevant to” climate change adaptation and mitigation decision-making in two 
steps (ibid.).   I outline ways that PEAs apparently can aid in such decision-making, in §1, and then 
assesses their argument for the claim that PEAs cannot aid in adaptation or mitigation decision-
making because the methods of PEA are “not designed for” making forward-looking inferences in 
§2.  I show that they reach this latter conclusion by oversimplifying, and thereby mischaracterizing, 
the basic reasoning process used in PEAs, and contend that their claim that PEAs are not relevant 
to adaption and mitigation decision-making is therefore misguided.  Although I concur that PEAs 
can directly inform decisions about addressing losses and damages, and concur that such studies can 
aid in building the sociopolitical infrastructure needed to appropriately respond to inevitable losses 
and damages, I then challenge Thompson & Otto’s proposed revisal of the UNFCCC framework in 
two steps.  In §3, I show that they do not provide sufficient motivation for developing policy 
mechanisms for addressing losses and damages that would operate according to a liability-based, 
“repair,” model.  Finally, in §4, I outline how the 2015 agreement made at COP21 in Paris preserves 
the provisional outcomes decided at COP19—whereby losses and damages are addressed via adaptive 
 The value of weather event science for pending climate policy decisions          4 
 
 
 
and mitigatory measures—and argue that the Paris Agreement opens a better path for making forward 
progress on addressing losses and damages than it would if it included liability-based mechanisms. 
 
1. Ways PEAs Can Inform Adaptation Decision-making    
1.1. PEAs Yield Information that Can Inform Adaptation Decision-making 
PEAs, and the data and ensemble models they use, provide information about changes in the 
successional patterns, intensity, and frequency of extreme weather events (cf. Peterson et al. 2012, p. 
1044).  So, it appears that there is a sense in which PEAs can inform adaptation and mitigation 
decision-making by providing information that enables more reasonable estimations about future 
weather events and their impacts in particular regions.  For example, data models used in PEAs can 
help show an observable increase in the periodic recurrence of “100 year” floods or droughts in a 
region due to anthropogenic climate change (Funk 2012; Luo et al. 2015; Peterson et al. 2013; Yu et 
al. 2014).  And such information can be extended to help make inferences about things like possible 
sociopolitical changes driven by extreme events in particular regions—such as an increase in the 
likelihood of conflicts driven by agricultural problems resulting from flood or drought conditions 
(Maystadt & Ecker 2014).  It also stands to reason that the information PEAs provided can augment 
climate risk models that have been developed specifically for the purpose of informing adaptation 
decision-making—such as simulation models designed to assess “economically optimal risk-
reduction strategies” (McInerney & Keller 2008; cf. Edwards et al. 2007).  Though their position is 
not overturned by these points, Thompson & Otto’s claim that PEAs are “not directly relevant” to 
adaption and mitigation decision-making is weakened by the fact that PEAs apparently provide a lot 
of information that is relevant to forward-looking decision-making. 
1.2. PEAs Can Help Make Better Predictions 
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PEA researchers have also demonstrated that even when they cannot link particular anthropogenic 
drivers (e.g. U.S. emissions) to particular weather event magnitudes,  they can still calculate the 
increased probability of particular events occurring (e.g. heat waves in Russia) given the occurrence 
of human-driven warming in general using the methods of PEA (Dole et al. 2011; Otto et al. 2012; 
Pall et al. 2011; Rahmstorf & Coumou 2011).  So, although PEAs may not ever permit one to 
precisely predict extreme events given the occurrence of certain drivers, it stands to reason that they 
can nevertheless help better estimate of the likelihood of possible future events.  It is true that it is 
not currently possible to predict the occurrence of extreme weather events with great precision, as 
there are countlessly many contingent factors that may come into play and therefore a high degree of 
uncertainty about possible contributory factors to future events (Stott et al. 2013).  Even so, the 
event simulations and statistical analyses used in PEAs can, at least, help make better predictions 
about possible future extreme events than are possible without them, and it appears that they can 
therefore aid in forward-looking policy decision-making. 
 Indeed, as a general point, models that cannot provide precise predictions are often useful 
for making better decisions than one could without them.  An accurate but imprecise weather 
forecast, like ‘there is a high probability of rain,’ surely helps one make better decisions about 
wardrobe and travel plans than she could without it.  And although one cannot precisely predict 
who will or will not get lung cancer from smoking, surely studies that link smoking in general to an 
increased probability of cancer help particular people make better informed decisions about personal 
choices and health risks.   Accordingly, it appears that PEAs can aid in forward-looking decision-
making by helping better estimate the likelihood of extreme events and their potential impacts—
contrary to what Thompson & Otto suggest. 
1.3. PEAs Can Enable Better Baseline and Threshold Estimation 
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Thompson and Otto’s claim is further undermined by the fact that the sorts of possible scenario 
simulations used in PEAs have apparent applications for helping make inferences about variables 
that are relevant to forward-looking policy and strategy decisions.  As just one example, it appears 
that such simulations have applications for helping estimate baseline and threshold parameters for 
variables that could be effectively influenced through the implementation of different policies or 
management strategies.  For instance, simulations of possible atmospheric conditions and of how 
the presence of certain climate drivers influences the likelihood of weather events have heuristic 
value for estimating baseline and threshold population abundance levels for valuable agricultural and 
medicinal species.  So, it appears that the methods of PEA have potential for aiding in forward-
looking decisions about species protection policies and management strategies (Challinor et al. 2009; 
Dumas & Ha-Duong 2013; Gienapp et al. 2013; Kurukulasuriya et al. 2011; Lobell et al. 2013; Seo & 
Mendelsohn 2008).  It is also reasonable to believe that the sorts of possible event simulations used 
in PEAs can aid in assessing adaptation policy and strategy options by being used to augment, and 
examine baselines and thresholds in, other kinds of scenario simulation models.  For instance, they 
could be used to augment existing socioeconomic models such as Shared Socioeconomic Pathways 
(SSPs) (Rozenberg et al. 2014). 
1.4. PEAs Can Aid in Value Prioritizations and Robustness Analyses 
Further still, it appears that the sorts of simulations PEAs use have heuristic value for formulating 
policies and strategies to reduce the likelihood that negative impacts of climate change will be 
experienced (Keller et al. 2008).  For example, whether event scenario simulations could aid in 
determining which of an array of possible adaptation or mitigation actions would most probably 
advance selected values.  One way such simulations could aid in forward-looking decision-making in 
this way is by being used to help simulate and assign probabilities to multiple possible scenarios in order to 
rank alternative policies and strategies.  Sandra Mitchell outlines the general way in which this sort of 
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“probability assigning” and ranking helps formulate more adaptive and robust policies and strategies 
with the following example.  She writes: 
 
[W]hen the amount of crop yielded by growing corn depends on the weather, then 
the various outcomes (high yield, low yield) are assigned a probability. The same 
procedure is applied to outcomes associated with each alternative choice, […for 
example,] growing soybeans. Instead of each distinct action that we are considering 
being associated with a single certain outcome with a single value, we consider [the 
possible] outcomes of each choice and their associated values consolidated in a 
measure of expected value. The expected benefit (or in the language of probability 
theory the “expectation value”) of an action is the sum of the possible outcome 
values weighted by their probabilities. If soybeans are more productive than corn 
when weather is bad and the probability of the weather being bad is high, then the 
expected value of growing soybeans may well be higher than the expected value for 
growing corn, even though one would actually do better growing corn in the less 
likely situation of the weather being good. (2009, pp. 86-7) 
Rather than detailing the formal methods via which simulation models extrapolated from ensemble 
data might be used to aid in this sort of “adaptive cost-benefit analyses” here, allow me to clarify my 
general point by glossing just one well-known methodology (Yzer et al. 2014).  This is “robust 
adaptive planning” (RAP)—developed by Bankes, Lempert, & Popper 2001 and expanded upon a 
great deal in follow-up works (see Popper et al. 2005; Lempert et al. 2002; Hall et al. 2012).  In brief, 
RAP is a decision-making methodology whereby one seeks the most “robust strategies” (those that 
maintain and grow options going forward) rather than selecting strategies that maximize utility.  
Proponents of RAP propose that researchers can determine what are the most robust policy and 
strategy options by: 
 “considering large ensembles of scenarios” 
 “using robustness criteria to compare strategy [alternatives]” 
 “employing adaptivity to [determine how to maximize strategy] robustness” 
 “using the computer as a tool to alternatively suggest breaking scenarios for 
candidate strategies and clever hedging actions to improve those strategies” 
(Lempert et al. 2002, p. 438). 
 Weather event simulations with models extrapolated from ensemble data models, like those 
used in PEAs, can aid in doing each of these four things.  There is therefore yet another sense in 
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which PEAs can aid in forward-looking decision-making; by helping researchers better simulate and 
assign probabilities to possible scenarios and thereby helping formulate and rank forward-looking 
adaptation and mitigation policy and strategy alternatives. 
2. The Claim that PEAs are “not designed for” Prediction is Misleading 
I have just provided grounds for questioning Thompson & Otto’s claim that PEAs are “not directly 
relevant to” forward-looking climate policy and strategy decision-making by outlining four ways that 
PEAs apparently can aid in decision-making about adaptive and mitigatory climate change 
responses.1  To give it a fair shake, I will now reconstruct their argument for their claims regarding 
the limitations of PEAs (in 2.1), and then show that their argument employs a mischaracterization of 
the inferential methods used in PEAs (in 2.2) and that their primary contention about the limitations 
of such studies is therefore misguided (2.3). 
2.1. Thompson & Otto’s Grounds for Claiming that PEA is Irrelevant to Adaptation Decision-making 
According to Thompson & Otto, PEAs give researchers “the ability to attribute the occurrence of a 
particular extreme event to climate change” but do not enable predictions about future events 
because they are “about events occurring today or in the recent past” (p. 3).  Taking this as given, 
they conclude that, “[PEAs are] not particularly germane to actions undertaken with the aim of 
reducing social vulnerability to climate change, and thus not directly relevant to adaptation planning” 
(ibid.).  They then elaborate on this reasoning, saying:  
[T]he methods for attributing an increased probability of a particular event of a given 
magnitude and meteorological state to climate change […] are designed to offer at 
least a partial and probabilistic explanation of the cause of that particular token extreme 
event. The methods of PEA are not designed to predict future occurrences of events 
of that type. (p. 7, emphasis not added) 
 From just this, it does not follow that PEAs cannot aid in forward-looking decision-making, 
since it is entirely possible that the methods employed in PEAs can be useful as such even if they are 
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not routinely used that way in currently.  Notably, however, Thompson & Otto do offer a bit more 
justification for their conclusion.  They say that because PEAs concern, “only particular recent or 
presently occurring extreme events” and the “changed likelihood of the occurrence of events [of 
that] very same type today, occurring under a specific atmospheric regime,” the results of such studies 
“may not hint at the future, since the circulation regime may well change further” due to factors 
which are “difficult—if not impossible—to predict” (ibid.). 
 So really, they infer that the methods used in PEAs are not useful for making inferences 
about future weather events because it is impossible to determine which factors will contribute to 
the background conditions for possible future events.  Their conclusion thus rests on the idea that 
inferences about weather events that have already occurred are grounded in data in a way that 
forward-looking inferences cannot be.  If this is right, the suggestions for how PEAs can aid in 
adaptation and mitigation decision-making I have outlined above would be problematic—since they 
all involve making forward-looking inferences from possible scenario simulations.  Yet, a closer look 
at the workings of PEAs shows that my suggestions are not undermined and that Thompson & 
Otto’s argument relies on a mischaracterization of the workings of PEAs. 
2.2. Thompson & Otto Mischaracterize How PEAs Work 
It is to be noted that my saying that their argument relies on a mischaracterization of PEAs is not 
meant to suggest that Thompson and Otto do not understand the technical procedures used in 
PEAs.  My claim is that they oversimplify and thereby underdescribe the inferential process used in 
such studies—in line with the way that PEA researchers often underdesribe that process when 
giving summaries of what they do in practice.  My point is then that their claim that the methods of 
PEA are “not designed for” making forward-looking inferences and, so, not relevant to forward-
looking decision-making only makes sense on that underdescribed, and not quite right, 
understanding of PEAs. 
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 Thompson & Otto’s argument glosses over two central aspects of PEAs in particular.  First, 
they underemphasize the integral role that possible scenario simulations (i.e., simulations of fictional 
or counterfactual events) play in the process of making risk attributions.  As I have said, PEA 
researchers attribute causal contributions of selected climate change drivers (e.g. past emissions) to 
the increased probability of a weather event occurring through comparative analyses of simulations 
with ensemble data models and counterfactual scenario simulations with models extrapolated from 
such data models.  Otto herself explains this quite clearly in a recent entry on the climate science and 
policy website The Carbon Brief, saying: 
Because we don’t get a lot of observations of the most extreme events, almost by 
definition, [risk attributions…] are based on large numbers of climate model 
experiments, called “ensembles”.  [PEAs] compare how often a particular extreme 
weather event occurs in model experiments representing the ‘world as it is’ (with 
human influence on climate) with how often it occurs in experiments representing 
the ‘world that might have been’, where the estimated impact of human influence on 
climate is removed.2 
Otto’s operational outline of how PEAs work in this entry is straightforward, correct, and in line 
with how the basic methods used in PEAs are typically understood.  And in perhaps the most widely 
cited PEA study, the authors describe the workings of PEAs in the same way, saying: “[in PEAs, 
t]he probability of a particular event happening in an ensemble of model simulations representing 
current conditions is compared with a parallel ensemble of model simulations representing an 
alternative world that might have occurred had the particular driver been absent” (Stott et al 2013, p. 
315).  Thompson & Otto do not explain this in their recent paper, and their overall argument 
underplays the central role counterfactual scenario simulations play in the reasoning process used to 
justify risk attributions. 
What’s more problematic is that they also underdescribe how PEAs work by failing to note 
that what is attributed via the methods of PEA is not the contribution that a selected climate change 
driver actually made to the realization of a weather event, but the contribution some selected driver 
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could have possibly made to the probability that that event might occur.  In fact, they explicitly claim that 
PEAs can provide “a partial and probabilistic explanation of the cause of” particular, token, events—
and make more general claims that ensemble models accurately ‘represent the world as it is.’  But, 
this is not right. 
It is true that PEA researchers make claims about which factors play substantive causal roles 
in bringing about particular events, and true that researchers make assumptions about the causal 
structure of nature.  However, the theoretical and mathematical machinery used in PEAs deals with 
abstract entities and probabilities and is itself blind to, or theory-neutral regarding, causality and 
matters of metaphysics (cf. Pearl 2000).3  Accordingly, the more correct thing to say is simply that 
PEA researchers make risk attributions on the basis of comparisons between data-driven simulations and 
simulations of counterfactual events, and therefore make inferences about actual events on the basis 
of simulated events in counterfactual “model worlds” (Hannart et al. 2015).  In this process, the 
calculation of the fractional increase in the risk of a selected extreme event occurring is based on 
simulations of counterfactual events.  Thompson & Otto’s argument is therefore problematic 
because they claim that the methods used in PEAs provide causal explanations, when they actually 
provide information about ‘the probability of possible events occurring, or not occurring, within 
models’ that researchers then use to make inferences.4 
2.3. A More Optimistic View of the Methods of PEA 
To be clear, I am not spotlighting the role of counterfactual scenario simulations in PEAs to suggest 
that these studies are somehow problematic.  I do so to illuminate the fact that the sort of evidence 
and inferential process used to justify risk attributions in PEAs is essentially the same sort of 
evidence and process that one would use to justify forward-looking inferences with the sorts of 
models used in PEAs.  The evidence used to justify risk attributions comes from counterfactual 
scenario simulations with models extrapolated from ensemble data models and the process is one of 
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making inferences about weather events on the basis of such simulations.  Hence, if one believes 
that the methods of PEA are sound and therefore useful for decision-making about losses and 
harms (as we should), one should also believe that they can be useful for forward-looking decision-
making.5 
This is because in either sort of effort researchers would use models extrapolated from data 
models, and change selected variables and parameter values in those models to simulate some 
counterfactual way(s) the world could be, to help make inferences.  In either case (“hindcasting” or 
“forecasting”), one makes inferences about weather events on the basis of information from 
simulations of counterfactual scenarios (cf. Stott et al. 2013).  So, risk attributions are not grounded 
data in a way that forward-looking determinations cannot be, as such inferences are made on the 
basis of simulations of counterfactual scenarios just as forward-looking inferences must be. 
I must admit that Thompson & Otto are right that one cannot calculate the fractional 
increase in the risk of a possible future event in the same way PEA researchers do when making risk 
attributions, because there is not, and cannot be, data on future events to enable this calculation.  
Yet, this hardly warrants their conclusion that the methods used in PEAs are not relevant to 
forward-looking decision-making.  It just means that one step in the specific technical process used 
to make risk attributions cannot be used for making forward-looking inferences.6  Even so, an array 
of different scenario analyses that can aid in forward-looking decision-making can be done with the 
sorts of models and methods used in PEAs.  So, although it is true that the specific procedure for 
estimating the fractional increase in the risk of an event in PEAs is not designed for making 
predictions, Thompson & Otto’s more general claim that the methods used in PEAs are not of use 
for adaptation and mitigation decision-making does not wash.  To the contrary, a careful look at the 
workings of PEAs shows that the model-based reasoning processes employed in these studies does 
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not differ from that employed in forward-looking model-based reasoning in any essential way, and 
shows that Thompson & Otto’s argument is problematic. 
 
3. The Proposed UNFCCC Framework Revision Lacks Motivation 
 
Although their claims about the relevance of PEAs to adaptation and mitigation decision-making are 
problematic, Thompson & Otto rightly point out that attributions of extreme weather events to 
climate change by the methods of PEA “are ethically significant and have normative implications for 
pending policy decisions” (p. 3).  And they succeed in establishing that PEAs would be useful for 
decision-making about reparations for loses and damages even if they weren’t useful for adaptation 
and mitigation decision-making.  They also rightly point out that PEAs provide information that can 
aid in developing “long-term international relations” and institutional infrastructure needed to 
respond appropriately to international and intergenerational justice issues due to anthropogenic 
climate change (ibid.).  Yet, their proposal for revising the UNFCCC policy framework is also 
problematic. 
Recall, Thompson & Otto recommend reversing the decision made at COP19 to address 
concerns about losses and damages via mitigation and adaptation strategies.  Specifically, proposing 
the development of a new pillar, “on par with [existing] mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, 
and financing” pillars, that would include mechanisms for addressing losses and damages that 
operate according to a “repair model”—whereby nations who have made more significant 
contributions to raising the probability of extreme weather events are held liable for experienced 
losses or damages.  Thompson & Otto offer three “conceptual reasons” to motivate this proposal, 
which I will now show do not suffice to do so. 
Following their order of presentation, their first “conceptual reasons to support the 
development of a mechanism for loss and damage into an independent pillar” is that losses and 
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damages are not addressed under mechanisms to address adaptation and mitigation concerns by 
definition in the UNFCCC framework (p. 3).  In the UNFCCC framework, mitigation mechanisms 
‘pertain to taking actions to reduce the magnitude of climate change by reducing the efficacy of 
climate change drivers’.  By contrast, adaptation mechanisms ‘pertain to taking strategies that reduce 
harms caused by extreme events and reduce risks of loses and harms.’  Hence, Thompson & Otto 
are right that:  “loss and damage are distinct from adaptation and mitigation, in the sense that there 
may well be residual loss and damages that cannot be successfully addressed” by mitigation or 
adaptation efforts (p. 6).  This is because adaptation and mitigation mechanisms are forward-looking 
and not designed to provide guidance in developing the sorts of backward-looking policies and 
strategies needed to address residual losses and damages. 
Of course, this is a good reason to further develop policy mechanisms for addressing losses 
and damages, and it is clear that liability-based mechanisms would serve as a means of addressing 
residual losses and damages.  However, this is not a sufficient reason to develop a separate pillar of 
the framework containing liability-based compensation mechanisms.  This is because, pending 
further justification, it is unclear that doing so would be beneficial.  It is also entirely possible that 
there are adaptation and mitigation measures that would provide better means of addressing residual 
losses than liability-based measures. 
Thompson & Otto’s second “conceptual reason” for developing a liability-based losses and 
damages pillar of the UNFCCC framework also does not suffice to motivate doing so.  As they 
explain their second justification, “the possibility of residual loss and damages supports the position 
that [the] WIM should not be located in CAF” (ibid.).  To a certain extent, this consideration is 
already implicit in their first, and essentially reinforces their claim that their proposal should go 
through because residual losses and damages are by definition neglected by adaptation and 
mitigation mechanisms.  However, it is an independent justification because their claim here is that 
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the mere possibility of residual losses and damages itself warrants developing an independent pillar 
containing liability-based compensation mechanisms.  Yet again, pending further justification, this 
consideration does not support developing such mechanisms, since it is at best unclear that this 
would offer any advantages and possible that there are viable adaptation and mitigation measures for 
addressing losses and damages.  Hence, while the possibility, and even actuality, of residual losses 
and damages certainly warrants the conclusion that enhanced measures for addressing losses and 
damages should exist, it does not justify developing independent liability-based policy mechanisms. 
Thompson & Otto’s final justification for their proposal is tied to their claim that PEAs can 
offer ‘at least a partial and probabilistic explanation of the cause of particular extreme events’ but cannot 
provide information relevant to forward-looking decision-making.  They contend that there should 
be a major pillar containing liability-based compensation mechanisms for addressing losses and 
damages because PEAs serve as a science that can aid in operationalizing such mechanisms but 
cannot aid in operationalizing mitigation and adaptation measures.  I have shown already that this 
conclusion is misguided (in §2).  Yet, even if it weren’t, this reason also does not suffice to motivate 
their proposal. 
To the contrary, in general, giving the development of preemptive adaptation and mitigation 
measures priority over developing repair-based responses to losses and damages seems the more 
practical route, even when the capacity to address losses and damages via reparative measures is 
more highly developed.  To illustrate this, suppose that one was aware of measures that would 
enable her to sufficiently cope with losses due to a home robbery (e.g. anxiety drugs and law 
enforcement), but was not aware of measures to adequately preempt or avoid potential future 
robberies (e.g. prediction abilities and security measures).  In this case, it does not seem that one’s 
effort to develop means of addressing losses due to robbery should be “on par” with her effort to 
develop ways of mitigating potential future losses and finding ways to adapt so as to avoid 
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experiencing such losses—even if her capabilities for operationalizing measures to mitigate and 
avoid losses were lacking.  Analogously, the claim that policy mechanisms for addressing losses and 
damages should be on par with those for addressing adaptation and mitigations concerns lacks 
intuitive appeal.  Even if it is true that we are better equipped to operationalize policies and 
strategies designed to address losses and damages through liability-based compensation measures 
(which is contentious in the least), it does not follow that we should not still put far greater effort 
into further developing mitigatory and adaptive measures. 
4. The Paris Agreement and the Path Forward on Loss and Damage 
Since the publication of Thompson & Otto’s 2015 paper, negotiations at COP21 in Paris produced 
an agreement that includes substantive revisions.  Most notably, the Paris Agreement does include a 
major section, or “independent pillar,” containing recommendations for further developing 
measures for addressing losses and damages.  However, those recommendations do not suggest 
developing liability-based compensation measures to address losses and damages but suggest taking 
primarily adaptive measures, and even include an explicit “no liability” clause (ibid. ¶52). 
In fact, the Paris Agreement preserves the provisional commitment to addressing losses and 
damages via mitigation and adaptation measures decided at COP19 by calling for, “continuation of 
the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change 
Impacts, following the review in 2016” (¶48).  The Losses and Damages section of the agreement 
also includes a substantive request of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International 
Mechanism to take steps to develop infrastructure to support risk insurance, and risk-transfer and 
pooling protocol, to address losses and damages before the 2016 review.  Specifically, it states that 
the committee is to establish: “a clearinghouse for risk transfer that serves as a repository for 
information on insurance and risk transfer, in order to facilitate the efforts of Parties to develop and 
implement comprehensive risk management strategies” (¶49).”  Finally, the no liability clause in the 
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Losses and Damages section plainly states that, “the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis 
for any liability or compensation” (¶52). 
Those who share Thompson & Otto’s desire to see liability-based measures for addressing 
losses and damages realized may be inclined to decry the outcome of the Paris negations—on the 
grounds that it is morally inadequate.  Yet, even though it may be morally inadequate, I submit that 
the Paris Agreement still opens a better path for making substantive forward progress on addressing 
losses and damages than it would if it included liability-based mechanisms.  Accordingly, I propose 
that rather than contesting the outcome in Paris, the most fruitful way forward will be to 
concentrate on developing proposals and possible implementation strategies for “comprehensive 
risk management strategies” and hashing out ways that the risk insurance and risk-pooling suggested 
in the agreement could be operationalized. 
An obvious practical reason to work with the Paris Agreement is simply that it is the 
agreement to which parties to the convention have already agreed.  What’s more, the 
recommendations contained in the Losses and Damages section are not just passable, but present a 
sophisticated way of dealing with the fact that many UNFCCC parties will likely never accept 
liability-based compensation measures—and could forever contend that it is not possible to establish 
liability for experienced losses and damages beyond any doubt.  The recommendations in the Paris 
Agreement are also consistent with UNFCCC parties’ standing commitment to the idea that 
sufficiently addressing justice issues due to losses and damages will require massive international, 
broadly sociopolitical, adaptation efforts to put in place the institutional architecture needed to do 
so.  A commitment is perhaps most clearly expressed within the WIM, wherein the working group 
advises further development of the Durban Platform:  
[Through e]nhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation [that] is 
urgently required to enable and support the implementation of adaptation actions 
aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing country Parties, 
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taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those developing countries 
that are particularly vulnerable.  [As well as through recognition of] the importance 
of regional and international cooperation with a view to promoting the establishment 
of alliances to support the implementation of actions aimed at reducing vulnerability 
and building resilience to the adverse effects of climate change. (UNFCCC 2013b, p. 
3) 
Finally, there is also a simple economic rationale for addressing losses and damages primarily via 
adaptation and mitigation measures that is presented in numerous places in the UNFCCC literature.  
For instance, in a technical report on non-economic losses (UNFCCC2013a) the working group 
explains that: 
There is a link between the magnitude of adaptation cost, mitigation cost and loss 
and damage. Increasing the mitigation effort (higher mitigation costs) would reduce 
loss and damage and make adaptation cheaper. For example, greater mitigation 
should result in a smaller increase in sea levels and so less protection from sea level 
rise will be required. Increasing the amount of adaptation (higher adaptation cost) 
will also reduce loss and damage. (p. 4) 
Those still wanting liability-based measures for addressing losses and damages despite these 
practical justifications for favoring adaptive and mitigatory measures should also consider that the 
measures outlined in the Paris Agreement will facilitate cooperation and the development of political 
infrastructure between “developing” and “developed” countries necessary to implement any 
compensation-based means of addressing losses and damages.    As Thompson & Otto say: 
[T]he degree of international cooperation requisite to build institutions appropriate 
to address the global and intergenerational environmental problems will depend 
upon achieving political reconciliation between the developing countries (who will 
suffer first, suffer most, and bear least historic responsibility) and the developed 
countries (who will likely suffer less in the short term but bear most historic 
responsibility)[.] (p. 11) 
In view of this, it should come as a considerable consolation to those wanting liability-based 
measures that the risk-pooling measures outlined in the Paris Agreement have the potential to serve 
as a means of making significant progress toward achieving the requisite sort of “political 
reconciliation.”  Indeed, the outlined risk-pooling measures arguably provide a better basis for 
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achieving cross-national reconciliations and facilitating morally acceptable responses to inevitable 
losses and damages than setting up provisions for liability-based restitutions.  This is because 
achieving political reconciliation and operationalizing adequate responses will require institutional 
adaptations and the development of international arrangements whereby probable climate change 
“victims” are provided options for maintaining a reasonable quality of life by parties who have 
driven climate change.  And, because they outline a judicious way to initiate such adaptions and 
agreements, the recommendations in the Paris Agreement are apparently superior to possible 
liability-based compensation measures.  In the very least, revising the recommendations on losses 
and damages in the Paris agreement to follow the “repair” model of justice Thompson & Otto, and 
many others, endorse would not offer any obvious advantages (pp. 11-12). 
 Acceptance of the fact that it is no longer possible to respond to climate change without 
dealing with losses and damages is reflected throughout the policy track that lead to the 
development of the WIM (UNFCCC 2013b).  Yet, accepting that there will be unavoidable losses 
and damages due to climate change does not require one to accept that focusing on efforts to make 
“repairs,” post loss and damage, is the best path forward.7  The Paris Agreement adheres to what 
Daniel Bodansky (2012) has called a “facilitative model” of international justice, which emphasizes 
developing institutional architecture and protocol for preempting and minimizing the magnitude of 
experiences of losses and damages.  Unlike a repair model, this model does not accept experienced 
losses and damages as precondition for reconciliation, but emphasizes initiating institutional 
adaptations whereby developed countries help people in developing countries avoid and cope with 
the impacts of extreme events by providing them options for doing so.  In accordance with this 
forward-looking model, the Paris Agreement outlines a path for making progress on addressing 
losses and damages via forward-looking adaptation and mitigation measures that I have argued offer 
practical and political advantages over backward-looking liability-based measures and that we should 
 The value of weather event science for pending climate policy decisions          20 
 
 
 
therefore embrace.  I submit, moreover, that the outcomes of the Paris negotiations provide 
grounds for much important work on how the suggested risk-insurance and risk-pooling could be 
operationalized and what reasonable “comprehensive risk management strategies” might look like.  
The Paris Agreement thereby also provides grounds for work exploring how PEAs can aid in 
devising risk-pooling protocol and risk management strategies. 
5. Conclusion 
Thompson & Otto (2015) highlight the importance of exploring the relevance of PEAs to pending 
UNFCCC decisions.  I have augmented their positive account of how PEAs can aid in policy and 
strategy decision-making by showing that, in addition to their potential to directly inform backward-
looking decisions about responding to experienced losses and damages, PEAs can play valuable 
heuristic roles in decision-making about forward-looking adaptive and mitigatory responses.  I have 
argued, moreover, that their proposal to address unavoidable losses and damages by adding liability-
based compensation mechanisms to the UNFCCC treaty has been outstripped by the practically and 
politically advantageous adaptive and mitigatory measures outlined in the Paris Agreement.  Finally, I 
have urged that the Paris Agreement provides a basis for making substantive progress on addressing 
losses and damages, and therefore opens avenues for crucially important work examining how risk-
pooling measures and risk management strategies can be best operationalized and avenues for 
further examination of how PEAs can aid in pending policy and strategy decisions. 
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1 There are many heuristic uses of models in general that I will not discuss here; Donhauser 2014 and Wimsatt 
2007 each discuss some of those uses. 
2 www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2014/10/attributing-extreme-weather-to-climate-change-in-realtime/  
3 Thompson & Otto address this somewhat by stipulating that PEA researchers attribute “probabilistic causes.”  
However, this is not to acknowledge that causal attributions are speculative hypotheses made by researchers and are not 
equivalent to the attribution of some simulated climate change driver within a model as a “probability raiser” 
within that model scenario.  What’s more, the notion of ‘probabilistic cause’ is deeply problematic for reasons I 
will not rehearse here; see Hitchcock 2004, Menzies 1989, Salmon 1980 for discussion. 
4 There are many, especially thorny, issues regarding the nature of causation and causal attributions that would 
significantly complicate this discussion, and that I will here assume can be met for reasons of editorial 
economy.  For readers who wish to pursue those issues and their bearing on evaluating PEAs, the relevant 
concerns are often addressed as the ‘problem of counterfactual conditionals’ in contemporary logic and 
philosophy of science.  This problem was first discussed in depth by Chisholm (1946) and Goodman (1947) in 
the relevant literature, and there is a rich literature considering the nuances of the problem; Collins et al (2004) 
provide an illuminating overview of the issue and its history.  Schaffer (2001) provides a helpful discussion of 
the difference between causes and ‘probability-raisers.’ 
5 Confidence in risk attributions must be founded upon a confidence in the theoretical machinery and 
systematic logical processes used to arrive at those inferences in PEAs, because founding it upon the fact that 
such attributions are consistent with the co-occurrence of selected drivers and weather events after the fact (i.e. 
post hoc ergo propter hoc) is to engage an egregious confirmation bias.   
6 I am not denying that there are differences between the model-based reasoning processes and uses of models 
in doing risk attribution analyses and doing predictive analyses.  These include using different mathematical 
tricks to minimize simulation error and other tricks to minimize prediction error, and also include the fact that 
that forward-looking simulations cannot be evaluated on the basis of their accordance with data-models. 
7 Indeed, one might reasonably contend that building a tolerance of losses and damages into the UNFCCC 
agreement as a default attitude would be morally unacceptable.   
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